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A Rejoinder
Nelson Lichtenstein
1 It is a pleasure and a challenge to engage these commentaries on my recent book, State of
the Union:  a  Century of  American Labor.  The pleasure is  there because this author,  like
almost every other, is deeply appreciative of the kind of critical attention, and sheer
energy,  to which his work is  subject.  The commentators assembled by Jean‑Christain
Vinel understood with remarkable precision the main line of argument I was trying to
advance, which has not always been the case on the American side of the Atlantic, where
some of the most prominent reviewers misconstrued the relationship I  was trying to
make between union traditions, rights discourse, and U.S. intellectual and legal thought.1
Of course, this does not mean that French academics are soft on State of the Union: these
four commentaries are a challenge because their critique is based on such an accurate
understanding of how and why my book is indeed a revisionist reading of U.S.  labor
history, especially insofar as I seek to reinterpret the rise, fall, and possible revival of the
“labor question.”
2 For those readers of TranstlanticA who have not read State of the Union, Donna Kesselman
starts off her commentary with an admirably succinct summary of the main themes and
chief historiographic innovations. However, she is not entirely pleased that my new book
breaks with the perspective I put forward 20 years ago in a study that emphasized the
limitations of the New Deal state and the bureaucratic devolution of the trade unions
during World War II. Although I would not label my 1982 book, Labor’s War at Home: The
CIO in World War II, a “New Left” study, it did share with that species of social criticism a
belief that the greatest threat to working class militancy came from the conservative and
bureaucratic trade union structures that had been imposed, through law, politics, and
leadership, upon a progressive strata of rank and file workers.
3 A  post  New  Left  sensibility  does  not  discount  such  retrograde  influences  upon
working‑class consciousness, but as Kesselman herself acknowledges, labor historians of
the early 21st century cannot ignore the extent to which the corporations and the
political right have normally sought to smash, rather than co‑op, the trade unions and
their allied organizations. “Corporate liberalism” of the sort imagined by C. Wright Mills,
James Weinstein, and a much younger and more radical Ronald Radosh never had much
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of a reality in the United States, which is why most contemporary labor historians also
discount the idea that the “labor‑management accord” of the 1950s and 1960s had much
depth or staying power either.  As Kesselman correctly puts it,  we are witnessing the
“decline of the New Leftist paradigm.”2
4 This naturally leads to a reappraisal of the New Deal and of the trade unions which briefly
flourished under its political and legal tutelage. There was such a thing as a “New Deal
Order,” a political  and economic structure that formed in the late 1930s,  reached its
apogee in the mid 1960s, when the African‑American population finally won a semblance
of social and economic citizenship, and then fell apart at some point in the late 1970s,
when  President  Jimmy  Carter  abandoned  even  the  most  tepid  efforts  to  sustain  a
Keynesian response to the stagnation crisis of that dismal decade. Kesselman argues that I
have created a contradiction for myself by simultaneously downplaying the existence of a
post World War II “labor management accord,” while at the same time saluting the idea of
a reformist New Deal order under which the trade unions, and economic liberalism more
generally, might flourish.
5 But  the  contradiction  disappears  when  one  abandons  the  idea  that  some  kind  of
pluralistic equilibrium characterized the first few decades after World War II.  Labor’s
strength, and the liberal politics of a generation of Americanized immigrants, sustained
New Deal statecraft in this era, not the depoliticized interest group politics celebrated by
pluralist ideologues like Seymour Martin Lipset and Daniel Bell. My book takes polemical
aim at these mid century intellectuals, not because they had much policy influence within
the unions, but because their pluralist understanding of how and why labor was so potent
in  the  1945‑1970 era  has  proved such a  disastrously  ill  informed guide  to  American
politics and class relations. For example, the steel industry histories recently published
by  Jack  Metzgar  and  David  Stebenne  demonstrate  that  the  strike‑prone  nature  of
industrial relations in steel was not a routinized form of mock combat, as so many leftists
once believed, but a kind of chronic, trench warfare that never generated the mutually
satisfactory  accommodation  celebrated  by  so  many  pluralists  (and  simultaneously
denounced by those farther to their left).3 Indeed, it was just this spurious sort of interest
group compromise that was at the heart of that stolid, self‑congratulatory “defense” of
mid century trade unionism offered by the liberal  pluralists,  which is  one important
reason that the legitimacy and value of trade unionism took such a downward plunge in
the 1960s when the civil  rights movement and its  off‑shoots put forward a new and
higher standard by which to judge American institutions and define a democratic polity.
6 State of the Union argues that it was precisely this devolution, this transformation of the
quest for an “industrial democracy” into a more limited program celebrating the technics
of postwar “collective bargaining,” that prepared the way for the eclipse of the American
labor question and its replacement, in public discourse and legal‑legislative statecraft, by
a discourse of rights that could never satisfactorily resolve the social and economic issues
put  forward  by  a  century  of  working‑class  agitation.  Catherine  Collomp  thinks  I
oversimplify this transition, and in truth the complexities inherent in the relationship
between race, rights, and class make it almost impossible not to strike a mechanistic note
when grappling with this conundrum. But to one charge I want to plead innocent: one
cannot write of race, and class, and identity as if they were separate constructs between
which the historian—or the social activist—must inevitably choose. In the United States,
as in most nations,  class consciousness and ethnic identities are entirely intertwined,
which is a point that State of the Union repeatedly seeks to make. The problem is not in the
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tangible reality of this embrication, but in the failure of the American labor law, not to
mention journalists, historians, and social scientists, to recognize this social fact.
7 Trade unions are in decline throughout much of the world today, and class as a category
of analysis is difficult to operationalize, but this is hardly because we have moved from a
world  of  dichotomous  classes  to  a  world  in  which  ethnic  and  racial  identities  have
suddenly intruded themselves into our social and political consciousness. If there is one
thing that the last generation of labor and social history scholarship has demonstrated, it
is that in the United States, and certainly elsewhere, a consciousness of ethnicity, race
and class can hardly be divorced. In United States history, ethnicity reinforces as much as
it  divorces class.  Indeed,  one  might  well  argue  that  during  the  hundred  years  that
preceded World War II, class rhetoric was as much the language of ethnicity as it was the
other way round. Herbert Gutman established his reputation as a founder of the new
labor history by demonstrating that 19th century Americans were incapable of generating
a class politics that was not thoroughly enmeshed in the ethnic, immigrant culture of the
working class majority. Steve Babson demonstrated that even among the self‑consciously
socialist,  laborite  skilled  workers  of  interwar  Detroit,  Anglo‑Gaelic  identities  and
traditions boiled just beneath the surface. Gary Gerstle’s account of the rise of industrial
unionism among French‑Canadian textile workers uncovered a dialectic between ethnic
self‑consciousness and trade union militancy. The linguistic trops were not the same as
those we would deploy today, but any effort to counterpoise French‑Canadian identity
and union consciousness during those Depression years would be entirely fruitless, if not
reactionary.  Likewise,  the  Latino  consciousness  that  has  infused  union  organizing
activities in so much of Los Angeles during the last decade is not unlike that of Gerstle’s
French‑Canadians  or  the  Slavic  steelworkers  commemorated  in  Thomas  Bell’s  classic
novel, Out of this Furnace. The problem is not identity consciousness per se, but the legal,
ideological, and institutional structures into which such identities are cast.4 
8 A juxtaposition taken from State of  the Union encompasses this historically contingent
interplay. During the middle decades of the 20th century, U.S. trade unionism held a legal
and political legitimacy, even among those adamantly hostile to its methods and goals.
Thus, advocates of African‑American freedom, whose movement was still groping for a
legal‑administrative understructure, sought to deploy the authority of the union idea for
their own “race” purposes. In the 1940s when Southern Bourbons wanted to discredit the
labor movement in their region, they denounced it as a racially subversive institution
that strayed well beyond its presumptive role as a well‑constrained collective‑bargaining
organization.  Southern  unions,  especially  African  American  unions,  were  illegitimate
because  they  sought  to  transform the  social  structure  of  the  South.  Segregationists
denounced the progressive black unions then emerging in Memphis, Winston‑Salem, New
Orleans,  and  East  Texas  as  Communist‑led,  integrationist  institutions  that  merely
masqueraded as trade unions. In defense, racially progressive unionists, both black and
white, sought to deflect this right wing assault by emphasizing that their organizations
were  bona  fide  trade  unions  first,  institutions  concerned  with  civil  rights  and  race
advancement  to  but  a  secondary  degree.  Of  course,  this  was  a  politically  adroit
subterfuge, confirmed during the last generation by every historian of the modern South.
In the 1940s, as well as in our own time, no distinction can be made along these lines.5 
9 By the late 1960s the social and linguistic landscape, not to mention the legal and political
infrastructure, had been thoroughly transformed. Thus when black sanitation workers in
Memphis sought to win union recognition for themselves,  they carried placards that
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proclaimed “I Am A Man,” an identity politics slogan if there ever was one. Few observers,
then or now, think of the Memphis strike as anything other than a civil rights struggle.
Indeed,  there  is  much evidence to  show that  had it  been perceived as  some sort  of
union‑management negotiation, it would never have emerged from its initial obscurity.6
By 1969 Southern elites, as well as union partisans, understood this new dynamic very
well indeed. Thus when Hospital Workers Local 1199B sought to build an organization in
Charleston, South Carolina, labor leaders cast their struggle almost entirely in terms of
the civil rights movement of that era, reminding friends and foes alike that Martin Luther
King  had  once  called  1199  the  “soul  power”  union.  Conversely,  South  Carolina’s
conservative elite insisted that the conflict in the Charleston hospitals was a question of
old‑fashioned trade unionism, not civil rights. State officials did not red‑bait or race‑bait
the civil rights/union activists, but to delegitimize the insurgency they insisted that the
absence of a state collective‑bargaining law made the effort to unionize illegal and futile.
Thus we find the Southern oligarchy capitalizing on the eclipse into which the postwar
union idea had fallen, while at the same time paying a backhanded tribute to the power of
an identity‑based, rights‑conscious social movement.7
10 The  effort  to  counterpoise  identity  politics  and  class  consciousness  does  justice  to
neither, but one can certainly find much in contemporary political culture that leads to a
devaluation of collective, class‑based institutions and the simultaneous legitimization of a
kind of rights consciousness that encourages an individualistic affirmation of racially
coded rights and entitlements. Although one can find a substantial body of postmodern
scholarship that sees class as little more than a metaphysical illusion, the main culprit
does not consist of those scholars who declare the death of class and then celebrate the
“new social movements” that have arisen during the last third of a century. Instead, the
transformation of identity politics, often through a legally structured discourse of rights,
has been a product of the trajectory taken by the main body of post 1960s liberalism. To
the extent that a constrained brand of identity politics has flourished, it is largely because
in the realms of politics, policy, and law, trade unionism and other forms of working class
activism have been systematically devalued, while a set of legal rights based on racial and
gender identity have been privileged, but in a fashion that most on the left might well
reject.
11 Labor  oriented  legal  scholars  have  become  increasingly  attuned  to  the  problematic
outlined  above.  In  a  stimulating  essay,  “Postmodern Unions:  Identity  Politics  in  the
Workplace,” Molly McUsic and Michael Selmi take as a given the fragmented, identity
oriented character of the contemporary workforce. They argue that working class unity,
within the unions and without, cannot be conjured out of a monochrome solidarity, but
will  require  a  “cosmopolitan”  perspective,  which  David  Hollinger  has  defined  as  a
“recognition,  acceptance,  and  eager  exploration  of  diversity”  within  a  much  larger
context. Here self‑identification is affirmed, not submerged into an abstract notion of
class solidarity. In this context unions function much like the borderland regions where
cultures  clash,  meld  and  transform themselves  into  a  more  cosmopolitan  entity.  As
McUsic  and  Selmi  put  it,  “unions  turn  from  being  mini‑legislatures  to  becoming
mediating institutions  with transformative aspirations  much like  the border  cultures
where changes occur through the clash of cultures.”8 
12 Labor historians  will  instantly  recognize that  such has  been the nature of  American
unionism,  certainly  when  it  was  most  successful.  During  their  heroic  youth  in  the
Progressive era, Steve Fraser has demonstrated that the needle trades unions represented
A Rejoinder
Transatlantica, 1 | 2003
4
a  tenuous  amalgam  of  Jewish  socialism,  Italian  syndicalism,  and  Lithuanian  shop
militancy, coexisting uneasily with the inchoate feminism of an immigrant workforce
that was overwhelmingly young and female. In the 1930s and early 1940s the Reuther
wing  of  the  United  Auto  Workers  consolidated  power  up  and  down  the  union
infrastructure by assembling an ethnopolitical  coalition that  proved more stable and
resilient, if also more accommodating to state power, than did the equally heterogeneous
caucus that  the rival  Communist  grouping sought  to  guide toward union leadership.
Likewise, those who organized packinghouse workers in the 1940s, hospital workers in
the 1950s, California farm workers in the 1960s, and hotel and home care workers in the
1990s  were  always  exquisitely  sensitive  to  the  negotiated  character  of  working‑class
solidarity and trade union practice.9 
13 Toward the end of her comment, Catherine Collomp makes an important point comparing
French and U.S. industrial relations traditions. Although actual union density in France is
quite low, the wage bargains that are struck generally extend to workers throughout an
industry.  This  used  to  be  the  case  in  the  United  States  as  well,  where  “pattern
bargaining,” in auto and steel  for example,  quickly established the wage and benefit
standards  for  a  far  larger  group  of  workers.  When  the  UAW raised  wages  at  Ford,
non‑union parts  plants in Indiana followed suit,  if  only to inoculate their  employees
against the union virus. Pattern bargaining of this sort, which flourished for almost 40
years after World War II, served to ameliorate the racialized wage and job constructs that
are  so  pervasive  across  the  American industrial  archipelago.  The collapse  of  pattern
bargaining in the 1980s has served to exacerbate “identity” politics in the workplace, as
much among white workers as those of color, because as Catherine Collomp notes, wage
differentials  and  job  distinctions  have  once  again  returned  to  the  stark,  inequitable
proportions characteristic of the early 20th century. 
14 Jean‑Christian  Vinel  believes  that  when  it  comes  to  an  appreciation  of  the  political
culture of the 1930s, State of the Union “paints a somewhat optimistic picture of the law,
leaving its weaknesses in the background.” Vinel believes that the very term, “industrial
democracy” is far too vague because it is open to so many meanings and interpretations.
Indeed, he thinks that my relatively favorable account of New Deal liberalism, which I
link to the union impulse, hides the weaknesses and contradictions that were inherent in
Wagner Act law and New Deal statecraft. Vinel takes issue with my effort to conjoin the
Wagner‑era economic recovery efforts, which required a strong trade union movement,
to the more ideologically charged effort, stretching back more than half a century, to
democratize the workplace and counter the power of corporations in American political
life.
15 It is true, as Vinel emphasizes, that during the National Recovery Administration years,
and  even  during  the  spring  of  1935  when  Senator  Wagner  advanced  his  bill  in  the
Congress, proponents of a transformed labor law argued that is was primarily a recovery
measure which would reduce industrial  strife  and thereby promote commerce.  Vinel
concurs with the recent work of David Brody in pointing out that the whole Wagner Era
labor relations apparatus was not based on fundamental constitutional rights, but rather
had an ad hoc character designed to resolve a set of economic issues that arose during a
limited era of economic distress. Like Vinel, I too am attracted to the scholarship of James
Gray Pope, Risa Goluboff, and other legal historians who argue that an older generation of
trade unionists got it right: that the legal basis of American unionism might well have
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been stronger had it been rooted in the constitutional guarantees, including that of the 13
th Amendment, banning “involuntary servitude.”10
16 But the Wagner Act is not silent on democratic rights in the work place. Indeed, one
feature of the legal realism that was so influential in the 1930s is an appreciation of the
actual power relations at the worksite, and what remedies would be necessary to vitalize
the employee right to “self‑organization.” In an insightful reading of the Wagner Act
history, with particular emphasis on the role that would be played by the representation
election, David Brody emphasizes that Robert Wagner and his generation understood that
if the unions were to flourish, even as institutions that regulated wages and working
conditions, then the Courts and the NLRB would have to assure that employer coercion
ceased when workers confronted the decision about whether or not they should form a
trade  union.  Employer  “free  speech”  during  a  union  certification  election—a
constitutional right certainly—was little more than an invitation to economic blackmail,
argued Wagner  and other  realists  in  the  1930s.  Worker  on worker  intimidation was
already prohibited by the common law, but the coercive employer threat to shut down
the factory or penalize uncooperative workers, inherent in any management comment on
the unionization decision, required a vigilant National Labor Relations Board that was
backed up by a judiciary sensitive to the real meaning of workplace democracy.11 
17 But the NLRB never really had a chance. Vinel places the blame on a set on influential
legal craftsmen, like Leon Keyserling and James Landis, who sought to build an intrusive,
administrative state, initially favoring labor and the left, but soon turned against those
elements of the body politic by the chilly winds that blew in from the postwar political
right.  I  think  Vinel  is  right  that  the  NLRB,  perhaps  unlike  the  more  recent  Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission,  never really established its  legitimacy,  in part
because  of  the  hyper‑political  character  of  its  personnel  and  its  subordination  to  a
judiciary  that  was  never  really  comfortable  with  the  powers  exercised  by  this
administrative agency. At a couple of points Vinel blames this failure on the absence of a
“strong social  compact”  that  might  have given the state  labor  relations  apparatus  a
certain autonomy. But as State of the Union argues, such a contract was never much of a
possibility in the United States, and that what appeared as a social compact or contract
during the 1941‑1973 era was in fact the product of labor’s combativeness sometimes
reinforced  by  the  corporativist  structures  essential  to  manage  inflation,  wages,  and
manpower during the war or cold war era emergencies.
18 Given such legal and administrative weaknesses, Vinel is critical of my deployment of the
phrase “industrial democracy” to describe the impulse that motivated both workers and
legislative craftsmen of the Wager Act era. One can find speeches where a Robert Wagner,
a  John  L.  Lewis,  or  even  a  Franklin  Roosevelt  proclaim the  need  for  an  “economic
constitutional order,” but such rhetoric was normally subordinated to the Wagner Act’s
larger purpose: fostering higher wages, economic recovery, and industrial peace.
19 But a law does not define itself by itself. The American labor law became a lightening rod
for  conservative  critics  because for  almost  a  full  generation it  did  generate  a  set  of
ideological and legal conditions that opened wide the door to a set of power‑sharing
transmutations deeply distasteful to the owners of productive property. Just as the civil
rights  laws  of  the  1960s  became  infused  with  a  far  larger  and  more  potent  set  of
ideological  and social  aspirations,  so  too did  even a  flawed Wagner  Act  generate  an
ideological and institutional progeny that constituted a radical challenge to traditional
hierarchies: racial, ethnic, economic, even gender. This did not last, and the Wagner era
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labor  law  soon  lost  most  of  its  transformative  edge,  but  one  cannot  discount  the
democratic  values  and  expectations  with  which  the  law  was  once  associated.  The
anti‑New Deal  conservatives  certainly  understood this  dynamic.  As  Colin Gordon has
explained, the late 1930s explosion of anti‑NLRB and anti‑union sentiment arose because
many businessmen “underestimated the impact of  unionism on management power.”
Likewise, as Ira Katsnelson and his associates have argued, Southern elites turned hostile
to the whole New Deal project in this same era when they came to realize that their
enjoyment of New Deal economic assistance also meant the unionized empowerment of
their subalterns, both white and African‑American.12
20 One reason for the controversary surrounding Wagner era efforts to empower a new
labor movement is that these efforts could not be divorced from a growing movement to
transform race relations by raising the social wage, as well as the real wage of minority
workers. Romain Romain Huret is right to emphasize that in the 1950s and 1960s, as well
as in more recent decades, the “labor question” has been largely replaced by that of the
old‑new “social question,” or as Great Society reformers might have put it, the problem of
poverty and the working poor. Throughout my book I tried to make clear that before 1940
most laborites and their allied reformers would have had a difficult time distinguishing
between these two “questions.” It was Leon Keyserling, of course, who had drafted the
Wagner Act and provided an “underconsumptist” rationale for its radical intervention
into the labor market, and it was that same Keyserling who emerged in the 1950s as the
chief critic of John Kenneth Galbraith and Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., whose portraits of an
affluent working class helped divorce the New Deal era labor agenda from key elements
of the Kennedy‑Johnson anti‑poverty initiatives. Such a dichotomy may well be fading in
the early years of the 21st century: Wal‑Mart’s employment practices are today a lighting
rod for criticism because of the failure of the world’s largest corporation to generate a
wage structure that actually lifts its employees much above poverty or provide them with
adequate health insurance.13
21 Huret is certainly correct to point out that during the labor movement’s postwar heyday,
the well being of the poor did not stand high on organized labor’s social agenda. But
Robert  Lampman’s  failure  to  win  a  support  from a  union  audience  for  the  kind  of
anti‑poverty program they might have been expected to support needs to be analyzed
and not just  condemned.  This failure is  real  and it reflects the insularity into which
postwar unionism had been forced by the straightjacket into that conservatives placed
upon the unions early in the postwar era. Although one can find evidence of a racial
“backlash” politics among rank and file white unionists in the 1940s and 1950s, the failure
of the unions to play a more active part in shaping the Great Society initiatives reflects
more than racial resentment. Rather, one of the major themes in my book emphasizes the
self‑ghettoization  inherent  in  the  firm‑centered  collective  bargaining  regime  toward
which the unions gravitated in the post World War II years. When unions like the United
Automobile  Workers  linked their  fortunes  to  the  success  of  a  company like  General
Motors, then it became increasingly difficult for even the most liberal union leaders to
avoid the marginalization of those governmental initiatives designed to transform the
lives of the men and women not covered by a UAW contract itself. And if this was true of
a union led by such ex‑socialists as Walter Reuther, one can imagine the situation in those
institutions run by unionists of a more prosaic sort. 
22 But it is important to recognize that this doleful situation, confronted by Lampman and
other anti‑poverty warriors, was not merely a function of the ideology of self‑satisfied
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union leaders or fat and sloppy rank and filers. The incapacity—indeed the illegality—of
union efforts to fight for a higher social wage represented a victory of the anti‑union
right, which in Taft‑Hartely and other legislation, successfully fought to depoliticize and
de‑radicalize the labor movement and penalize any union activities that strayed too far
beyond  nuts  and  bolts  unionism.  So  by  the  1960s  the  cadre  of  unions  like  the
Communications Workers of America had internalized the anti‑union agenda: stick to
collective bargaining or you will start banging your head against a conservative wall of
political and managerial resistance.
23 When it comes to the poverty program per se, Huret takes me to task for adopting a
conventionally leftwing skepticism as to the merits and trajectory of the War on Poverty.
Unlike the material I offer on the New Deal, where the liberal policymakers come out
looking pretty good, State of the Union is either silent or negative on the “bureaucrats”
who formulated and administered the Great Society programs. It is true that I don’t get
inside the controversies that swept through the administrations of presidents Kennedy
and  Johnson,  but  my  general  perspective  is  clear:  to the  extent  that  a  “structural”
approach to the problem of poverty racialized and culturalized anti‑poverty policy, then
the  Great  Society  reformers  were  treading  on  ground  that  was  both  politically  and
economically  dangerous.  A  more  efficacious,  if  in  the  long  run  more  expensive  and
disruptive approach, was that of the old New Dealers like Leon Keyserling and Willard
Wirtz. Keyserling’s refusal to distinguish between poverty and unemployment was not
just  good  economics  but  good  politics. Raising  the  minimum  wage,  indexing  Social
Security (enacted during the Nixon years!), and providing health insurance for the elderly
are  examples  of  programs  that  Theda  Skocpol  has  labeled  “targeted  universalism”
because while these are entitlements for all citizens, the poor and the racial minorities
benefit the most. The negative income tax, or Earned Income Tax Credit, is something less
than universal,  because  only  the  working  poor  benefit.  Huret  applauds  this  popular
program, and so do a surprising number of conservatives and centrist liberals in the
United States,  but organized labor is  right to be less than enthusiastic,  because ETIC
amounts to a payroll subsidy for employers of low wage labor.14
24 Enough. It pains me that the commentators on my book are so knowledgeable about the
United States, while I remain so ignorant about the French labor movement and the legal,
cultural, and political context within which it fights and lives. But then that imbalance
merely reflects a larger Transatlantic dichotomy that has been so frequently in the news
of late.
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